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Abstract 
Societal inequality has been found to harm the mental and physical health of its members and 
undermine overall social cohesion. We examine the extent to which inequality is associated 
with a wish for a strong leader. We tested this hypothesis in a cross-national study involving 
28 countries from 5 continents (Study 1, N=6112), an Australian community sample (Study 
2, N=515) and two experiments (Study 3a, N=96; Study 3b, N=296). We found correlational 
(Studies 1 and 2) and experimental (Studies 3a&b) evidence for our prediction that higher 
inequality enhances the wish for a strong leader. We also found that this relationship is 
mediated by perceptions of anomie, except in the case of objective inequality in Study 1. This 
suggests that societal inequality enhances the perception that society is breaking down 
(anomie), and that a strong leader is needed to restore order (even when this leader is willing 
to challenge democratic values).  
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“Our Country Needs a Strong Leader Right Now”:  
Economic Inequality Enhances the Wish for a Strong Leader 
 
I reached the conclusion that no party, but a single man could save Germany. This 
opinion was shared by others, for when the cornerstone of a monument was laid in my 
home town, the following lines were inscribed on it: “Descendants who read these 
words, know ye that we eagerly await the coming of the man whose strong hand may 
restore order” (Abel, 1938/1986, p.151) 
 
The above quote captures the reflections of a Nazi high school teacher in the 1930s. 
Witnessing the economic chaos during the Weimar republic strengthened his belief that what 
Germany needed was a leader—Hitler—who would be strong, and therefore able to restore 
order (Abel, 1938/1986). Even though we now know that this particular leader’s rise to 
power marked the start of one of the darkest periods in human history, there is evidence that 
the call for strong leaders—defined here as someone who aims to overcome difficulties a 
group or society is facing by any means necessary (including non-democratic means)—is 
also ardent in current times. For example, in a recent survey, Ipsos (2018) asked respondents 
residing in 25 socio-economically diverse countries to what extent they agreed that ‘To fix 
[our country], we need a strong leader willing to break the rules’. Fifty-two percent of 
respondents agreed with the statement to at least some degree and only 21% of respondents 
disagreed.  
In explaining Hitler’s rise to power, theorists pointed to the economic instability in 
the Weimar Republic in the years preceding the Nazi regime—instability that was primarily 
caused by hyperinflation, poverty resulting from repayment costs following WWI, and weak 
government (Abel, 1938; Arendt, 1951). Even though the specific forms of economic 
instability that characterized pre-WWII Germany may not be a concern most Western 
societies encounter today, they do face another threat in the form of rising economic 
inequality. Economic inequality contributes to economic instability and may trigger 
economic recessions (Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012).  
 In the current research, we tested the idea that economic inequality is associated with 
the wish for a strong leader. We also explore a potential mechanism for this relation. 
Specifically, we predicted that inequality fuels people’s perception that society is breaking 
down—captured by the sociological concept of anomie (Durkheim, 1897/1987; Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2001; Teymoori, Bastian, & Jetten, 2016); a circumstance people will perceive as 
best arrested by strong leadership.  
Economic Inequality, Anomie and the Wish for a Strong Leader 
Although it is well-established that when economic inequality increases in a society 
there is an associated depression in trust, cooperation, and social cohesion (e.g., Elgar, 2010; 
Gustavsson & Jordahl, 2008; Van de Werfhorst & Salverda, 2012), a paucity of empirical 
attention has been paid to the impact of economic inequality on citizens' socio-political 
attitudes. However, there are reasons to expect that people’s political beliefs and preferences 
may also be affected by economic inequality (Jetten et al., 2017). For instance, initial 
evidence suggests that higher levels of economic inequality are related to lower political 
participation (Mueller & Stratmann, 2003; Solt, 2008), lower support for democracy 
(Andersen, 2012) and greater endorsement of authoritarian values (Solt, 2012). Furthermore, 
sociologists have suggested that economic inequality (Burgoon, van Noort, Rooduijn & 
Underhill, 2018) and cultural alienation (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016) may have contributed 
to the rising appeal of populist parties and radical leaders.  
In this paper, we tested one possibility implied by this work and examined whether 
there is a positive association between levels of economic inequality and the wish for a strong 
leader (H1). We also examined a potential mechanism underlying this relation and propose 
that perceptions of anomie are affected by inequality, and in turn, affect the wish for a strong 
leader. A familiar concept in sociology is that of anomie—a state of society characterized by 
social dysfunction and chaos in which society provides little moral guidance to its citizens 
(Durkheim, 1897/1987). Consistent with Durkheim’s reasoning, we propose that high levels 
of economic inequality may trigger feelings of anomie. Subsequently, the more people 
perceive there to be a breakdown of the social order, the more they should prefer a strong 
leader who ‘takes charge and make things right’ (H2). In line with this hypothesis, Haslam 
and Reicher (2007) showed that leaders and groups who are seen to provide a viable 
alternative to the status quo become more attractive in contexts in which people have lost 
faith in the system. Submitting oneself to strong authorities may be a way to deal with 
feelings of insecurity and anxiety that result from societal dysfunction (Scheepers, Felling, & 
Peters, 1990). We assessed these heretofore untested hypotheses empirically across three 
studies using a triangulation of research methods. 
Study 1 
In a first study, we assessed whether there is support for our hypothesized mediation 
model across 28 countries. We measured inequality in two ways: objectively, using the Gini 
coefficient, and subjectively, among respondents of these 28 countries. We did this because 
subjective perceptions of inequality may explain variance in outcomes over and above that 
accounted for by objective indicators (see Van de Werfhorst & Salverda, 2012; Wilkinson & 
Pickett, 2009). We, therefore, tested our hypotheses around the wish for a strong leader (H1) 
as mediated by anomie perceptions (H2) for both inequality measures.  
Method 
Participants. The data collection process started in January 2014 and ended in 
February 2015.1 Participants were recruited through 30 universities in North America 
(Canada, and the US [one data set from Tennessee and one from Northern California]), South 
America (Chile, Brazil), Europe (Netherlands, UK, Spain, Italy, Germany [one dataset from 
former East Germany and one from former West Germany], France, Denmark, Finland, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Latvia), Asia (China, Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, India, Pakistan), the Middle East (Iran), Africa (South Africa), and 
Oceania (Australia). The original version of the questionnaire, which was in English, was 
translated into the respective native languages of the countries. If necessary, either a back-
translation or panel method was used for the translation of the survey. The participants 
completed the survey via an online platform or on a hard copy. We aimed to recruit at least a 
150 participants per country. In some cases, this was not feasible (e.g., end of semester which 
made it impossible to recruit the required number of participants) and data collection had to 
be stopped prematurely. This was the case in the UK (N = 74), Malaysia (N = 112) and 
California (N = 141).  
A total of 6112 undergraduate university students completed the questionnaire. The 
mean age of the participants was 22.53 (SD = 6.35) and 67% of the sample was female. 
Descriptive statistics of the whole sample are presented in Table 1. Country-level descriptive 
statistics can be found in the Supplementary Materials.  
Measures. Economic inequality. We included two indicators of inequality in our 
analyses. First, the GINI coefficient was taken from the UN Human Development Report 
2014 whereby a higher score (between 0 and 1) indicates greater levels of inequality. The 
                                                 
1 This study is part of a larger data set. As part of the validation of the anomie scale, the relation 
between anomie and objective inequality is also examined and reported in Teymoori, Jetten et al., 
2016 (Studies 3a,b). 
GINI coefficients in this dataset ranged from .27 to .63.  Second, we measured subjective 
perceptions of inequality (subjective inequality for short). Participants were presented with a 
table of five rows showing five wealth categories: “very poor”, “poor”, “average in wealth”, 
“wealthy”, and “very wealthy”. They were asked to “think of 100 citizens in their country 
and asked how many of these 100 people would be classified into the different wealth 
categories. Participants estimated the number of people in each wealth category and wrote the 
number in a box at the end of each row, with the five estimates adding up to 100 people. The 
perceived inequality index was calculated in the same way as the calculation of the GINI 
coefficient and scores could range from 0 to 1 (see Supplementary Materials). In our sample, 
the perceived inequality index ranged from .00 to .38, with higher scores indicating that 
participants perceived higher levels of inequality in their country. 
Anomie. Recently, Teymoori, Bastian and Jetten (2016) have brought the concept of 
anomie under a social psychological spotlight. Adopting Durkheim’s (1897/1987) 
conceptualization, they define anomie as an individual’s perception that society is breaking 
down, reflecting both a perceived breakdown of social fabric and a perceived breakdown of 
government in society. More specifically, Teymoori et al. (2016) argued that anomie is a 
collectively shared perception within society and will arise when (a) people feel others cannot 
be trusted and do not follow moral principles, and when (b) leaders or governments are 
perceived to be ineffective and illegitimate.  
The two dimensions of anomie (i.e., breakdown in social fabric and breakdown in 
government) were measured using the 12-item scale developed by Teymoori and colleagues 
(2016). Six of the items assessed the perceived breakdown in social fabric. Two examples of 
such items are: “In [country] today, everyone thinks of him/herself and does not help others 
in need” and “In [country] today, people think that there are no clear moral standards to 
follow”. The other six items measured the perceived breakdown of government/leadership: 
e.g., “In [country] today, the government laws and policies are effective” and “In [country] 
today, the government is legitimate” (both items were reverse coded). All items were 
measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). Thus, 
a higher score indicated a stronger perception of anomie. The reliability of the 12-item scale 
was good (α=.82). 
Wish for a strong leader. Our key dependent variable was measured with three items 
whereby participants were asked to indicate their agreement with statements about the 
country’s leadership: “Our country needs a strong leader right now”, “We need strong 
leadership in order to make this society survive”, and “We need strong leadership in order to 
overcome societies’ difficulties”. Participants indicated to what extent they agreed with the 
statements on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). A 
higher score denoted a stronger wish for a strong leader (α=.92). 
Political orientation, gender, wealth of the country, state of democracy and 
homicide rates. In our analyses, we controlled for a number of variables that might covary in 
meaningful ways with our key variables. First, we controlled for political orientation because 
individuals on the right end of the political spectrum have been found to value authorities 
more (Altemeyer, 1998) and therefore would be more likely to wish for a strong leader. 
Political orientation was measured using two items adapted from the European Social 
Survey, whereby participants were asked to place their views on social and economic issues 
on a left-wing/right-wing scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly left) to 7 (Strongly right). The 
correlation between the two items assessing political orientation was moderately high and 
significant (r= .60, p<.001) and the items were averaged.  
We also controlled for gender (female = 0, male = 1) and wealth of the country as 
indexed by the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at purchasing power per capita (the 
2014 value). This measure assesses the total value produced in a country in a given year per 
citizen after equalizing the differences in price levels. Scores were measured in US dollars 
and divided by 10,000. Hence, values ranged from 4.80 to 83.80, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of national wealth.  
Furthermore, we controlled for the state of democracy in every country using the 
Democracy Index 2014 compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. Based on 60 indicators 
divided into five categories (i.e., electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of 
government, political participation, and political culture), the index assesses the level of 
democracy on a scale from 1(Authoritarian) to 10 (Fully democratic). Scores in our sample 
ranged from 1.98 to 9.11.   
Finally, we included the homicide rate of each country as a proxy for the level of 
violence because higher levels of inequality may be related to higher levels of violence 
(Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Whitworth, 2012) and to an increased perception that society is 
breaking down. Data on homicide rates per 100,000 were obtained from the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime for the year 2014. For Malaysia, no data was available for the 
year 2014. Therefore, we included the homicide rate of 2013 for this country. The sample’s 
homicide rates per 100,000 ranged from 0.26 to 32.65. 
Method of Analysis. Because the data were collected in different countries, it is 
important to take the nested structure of the data into account. We estimated the multilevel 
models in MPLUS Version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). The only variables with relatively 
large numbers of missing cases were subjective inequality, political orientation and gender: 
367 (6%), 281 (4.6%) and 286 (4.6%), respectively. In the case of political orientation and 
gender, this was mainly due to the fact that these questions were not included in Pakistan. For 
all other included variables, the number of missing values did not constitute more than 0.02% 
of the sample. The missing cases were dealt with by MPLUS using Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) assuming that missing values were missing at random (Muthén 
& Muthén, 2012). Two samples were collected in Germany (East and West) and the USA 
(Tennessee and California), and these were included as separate countries. 
Results  
Descriptive results. Despite significant variation across countries (see Supplementary 
Materials), the overall levels of participants’ wish for a strong leader and anomie were 
relatively high (see Table 1) and both mean scores were above the midpoint of the scale.  
In line with previous findings, although there was a positive and significant 
correlation between the objective and subjective indicators of inequality, this association only 
accounted for around 12 percent of their respective variances. Consistent with our 
expectations, both inequality measures had significant positive correlations with the wish for 
a strong leader as well as anomie. Anomie, in turn, was significantly positively correlated 
with the wish for a strong leader.  
 
  
Figure 1. Final model representing the relation between objective inequality, subjective 
inequality and the wish for a strong leader mediated by perceptions of anomie, Study 1. See 
Table 2 for further statistical detail.  
Note. Standardized coefficients presented. *. p < .05, *** p < .001. 
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Multilevel analyses. We performed the multilevel analyses in two steps. In a first 
step, we compared the null model to the intercept-only model. A significant part of the 
variance in the wish for a strong leader (ICC = .27) and anomie (ICC = .25) was found to be 
between countries. In a second step, we added the predictors to the model using a stepwise 
approach (see Supplementary Materials). The model that included all individual and country 
level predictors provided the best fit to the data; we interpret the model coefficients below.  
Both objective and subjective economic inequality predicted the wish for a strong 
leader (see Table 2 and Figure 1). In relation to the objective inequality measure, this 
suggests that there is greater baseline support for strong leaders in more unequal countries. 
Interestingly, subjective economic inequality was significantly positively associated with the 
wish for a strong leader, even after controlling for objective levels of economic inequality. 
Furthermore, although there was no evidence that anomie mediated the impact of objective 
inequality on the wish for a strong leader, anomie did mediate the effect of subjective 
economic inequality on the wish for a strong leader. While both objective and subjective 
inequality were associated with a greater wish for a strong leader, only higher subjective 
economic inequality was associated with higher levels of anomie.  
As a robustness check, we re-ran the meditational analysis separately for the social 
breakdown (α=.77) and government (α=.82) anomie dimensions. Results were largely 
identical to those reported above: Subjective (but not objective) economic inequality was 
significantly positively associated with both anomie dimensions, and both anomie dimensions 
were positively and significantly related to the wish for a strong leader. Interestingly, 
however, although subjective inequality had a similarly strong effect on both anomie 
dimensions, the effect of the perceived breakdown in social fabric on the wish for a strong 
leader was significantly stronger than the effect of perceived breakdown in government, ∆b = 
0.08, SE = 0.03, p = .008. This suggests that particularly the perceived breakdown of social 
fabric plays an important role in explaining the relation between perceived inequality and the 
wish for a strong leader (see Table 4, Supplementary Materials).  
As another robustness check, we re-ran the mediation analysis on the individual level 
adding the different countries as controls in the form of dummies. This means that country-
differences were accounted for providing more confidence that unobservable differences 
between countries were not driving the observed associations (see Table 6 and Figure 2, 
Supplementary Materials).  
 
  
Table 1  
Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for main variables, Study 1 
  
 Range M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Wish for a strong leader 1-7 5.25 1.52              
2. Objective inequality .27-.63 .38 .09 .30***            
3. Subjective inequality  0-.38 .21 .06 .28*** .35***          
4. Anomie 1-7 4.32 .88 .23*** .21*** .33***       
5. Political orientation (right-wing) 1-7 3.79 1.23 .20*** .05** -.01 .08***     
6. GDP 4.80-83.80 34.38 18.80 -.33*** -.37*** -.48*** -.36*** -.07***    
7. Democracy index  1.98-9.11 7.61 1.53 -.17*** -.21*** -.25*** -.20*** -.08*** .45***   
8. Gender (male) 0/1 .33 - -.10*** -.07*** -.05*** .02 .03* .06*** -.02  
9. Homicide rate .26-32.65 4.44 9.04 .22*** .82** .33*** .22*** -.01 -.40*** -.02 -.06*** 
Note. * p < .05 ** p < .01 ***p < .001   
 
  
 Table 2  
Final Multilevel model predicting anomie and a wish for a strong leader, unstandardized coefficients 
presented, Study 1 
 Anomie perceptions Wish for a strong leader 
 b 95% CI p b 95% CI p 
Intercept 4.67 [3.78, 5.62] <.001 3.41 [1.44, 5.38] .001 
Individual level       
 Anomie    0.19 [0.15, 0.23] <.001 
 Subjective inequality        
  Total 2.05 [1.66, 2.44] <.001 0.96 [0.30, 1.62] .004 
  Direct    0.57 [-0.09, 1.23] .088 
  Subjective inequality  Anomie    0.38 [0.27, 0.50] <.001 
 Political orientation (right-wing) -0.08 [-0.09, -0.06] <.001 0.17 [0.14, 0.20] <.001 
 Gender (male) 0.02 [-0.03, 0.06] .431 -0.17 [-0.24, -0.10] <.001 
Country level       
 Objective inequality       
  Total 0.34 [-1.60, 2.28] .728 4.30 [0.28, 8.32] .036 
  Direct    4.20 [0.20, 8.10] .039 
  Objective Inequality   Anomie    0.15 [-0.72, 1.01] .740 
 GDP -0.01 [-0.02, -0.01] .001 -0.02 [-0.03, 0.00] .041 
 Democracy Index -0.03 [-0.10, 0.05] .471 -0.02 [-0.14, 0.18] .829 
 Homicide Rate 0.01 [-0.02, 0.03] .673 -0.02 [-0.06, 0.03] .452 
Variance components  
 Individual level 0.56 [0.54, 0.58] <.001 1.55 [1.50, 1.61] <.001 
 Country level 0.08 [0.04, 0.12] <.001 0.35 [0.17, 0.53] <.001 
Fit statistics 
Log Likelihood (parameters) -22468.07 (28) 
AIC 44992.14 
Explained variance  
Individual level .04   .04   
Country level .46   .32   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Discussion 
 Study 1 showed that both objective and subjective inequality were positively 
associated with the with for a strong leader. Even though objective indicators of inequality 
and subjective perceptions may not always be aligned (e.g., Chambers, Swan, & Heesacker, 
2014; Norton & Ariely, 2011), we found that they both predicted the outcomes of interest. 
We also found evidence for an effect of subjective inequality on the wish for a strong leader 
via perceptions of anomie, indicating that the effect of subjective economic inequality on the 
wish for a strong leader may partly be explained by a feeling that society is breaking down.  
 In this first large-scale study, we included a rather general measure of wishing for a 
strong leader which did not explicitly measure support for a leader using non-democratic 
means. Therefore, in our second study, we extended this measure by trying to capture the 
extent to which participants would be in favor of a strong leader who is willing to forego 
democratic values, break the rules or change the status quo to achieve desired outcomes.  
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. As part of a larger survey, 515 Australian citizens were asked about 
their subjective perceptions of inequality in Australia, their perceptions of anomie and their 
wish for a strong leader. Data were collected online via Qualtrics Panels LLC in 2017. The 
age of the sample ranged from age 19 to 80 (M = 43.47, SD = 16.41), and included 263 
women and 252 men. The sample size was determined by financial considerations: Qualtrics 
charged AU$11.50 per participant and our budget allowed for 500 participants. 
Measures  
Economic inequality. We measured perceived inequality in the same way as in Study 
1. In this sample, the perceived inequality index was on average .20 and ranged from .00 to 
 .36, with higher scores indicating that the participant perceived higher levels of inequality in 
Australia. 
Anomie and wish for a strong leader. Anomie was again measured using the 12-item 
scale (α=.80) developed by Teymoori and colleagues (2016). Wish for a strong leader was 
measured with the same three items as used in Study 1 and we added four items that assessed 
more explicitly support for a leader who is willing to be more authoritarian and less 
democratic. The additional items were prefaced as “Australia needs a strong leader” followed 
by “who is willing to challenge democratic values and practices”, “who is willing to break 
the rules”, “who wants to change the status quo” and “who keeps tight control over the 
country’s decisions and activities.” Participants indicated to what extent they agreed with the 
statements on a 7-point scale and a higher score denoted a stronger wish for a strong leader 
(α=.89). 
Political orientation, gender, age, education and income. We also measured political 
orientation (two items on a scale ranging from “left wing” to “right wing” and from “very 
liberal” to “very conservative”, r = .57, p<.001), gender, age, education and personal annual 
income and controlled for these in our analyses. 
Results 
Descriptive results. As in Study 1, levels of anomie and wish for a strong leader were 
relatively high (Table 3). As predicted, the key variables positively correlated with each 
other: Higher levels of subjective inequality perceptions were associated with a greater wish 
for a strong leader. Both measures also positively correlated with perceived anomie. 
Noteworthy too, subjective inequality perceptions were also positively correlated with both 
dimensions of anomie separately (with breakdown of social fabric, r = .17, p<.001, and with 
breakdown of government, r = .27, p<.001). Furthermore, both breakdown of social fabric 
 and breakdown in government were positively related to the wish for a strong leader (r = .23, 
p<.001 and r = .32, p<.001, respectively). 
Mediation model. We then examined whether anomie mediated the relation between 
subjective inequality and the wish for strong leadership. Mediation analyses were performed 
using the Process macro for SPSS (Model 4), with bootstrapping for 5,000 resamples and 
95% confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). We found a significant indirect effect of 
subjective inequality via perceptions of anomie on the wish for strong leadership; indirect 
effect = 1.37 (0.32), 95% CI = [.81, 2.02]. The direct effect remained significant, direct effect 
= 1.52 (0.72), 95% CI = [.11, 2.93] (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Table 3  
Partial correlations, Means and Standard Deviations (SD), Study 2 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 
1. Subjective 
inequality 
.20  .07  1     
2. Anomie 4.43 .82  .27***  1   
3. Wish for a strong 
leader 
5.32 1.10 .18***  .33***  1 
Note. Partial correlation analyses controlled for gender, political orientation, 
age, education and personal annual income.  
** p. < .01 *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Indirect effect of economic inequality on wish for a strong leader mediated by the 
perception of anomie, Study 2.  
Note. *p < .05, ***p <.001 
3.38*** 
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 Discussion 
Study 2 provided additional support for our hypothesized mediation model using a 
community sample of Australians. Akin to Study 1, subjective inequality perceptions 
(calculated in the same way as the Gini coefficient is computed) were positively associated 
with the wish for a strong leader. Our expanded measure of wishing for a strong leader 
provides us with greater confidence that perceived inequality not only enhances wanting a 
strong leader, but this desire extends to a leader who is prepared to break rules or use 
undemocratic means to achieve their goals. We also again found that anomie perceptions 
mediated this relation. This strengthens our reasoning that economic inequality perceptions 
enhance the feeling that society is breaking down (in terms of its social fabric and 
government), fueling a desire for a leader who will restore order (by whatever means 
necessary). 
Studies 3a and 3b 
Studies 1 and 2 supported our predictions but are limited in the sense that they are 
cross-sectional. We then conducted two experimental studies—Study 3a using an 
undergraduate student sample and Study 3b using a US online user sample—where we 
manipulated economic inequality. This design allowed us to assess whether high inequality 
causes a greater wish for a strong leader.  
Method 
Participants. The sample of Study 3a consisted of 96 Australian undergraduate 
students who participated in return for course credits (63 women, Mage = 21.11, SD = 6.03). 
The study was conducted at the end of the academic year and we finished data collection 
when the number of undergraduate students signing up to take part in the study dropped 
markedly. To contend with the possibility that the initial study was under-powered, we then 
conducted Study 3b with a sample of 296 US residents recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
 Turk (161 women, Mage = 41.53, SD = 11.11). The size of the sample of Study 3b was 
calculated such that it provided a 90% chance of detecting an effect half the size of that 
obtained in Study 3a (i.e., d = 0.39, α = .05, 1 - β > .90; see Camerer et al, 2018). Study 3b 
was pre-registered on osf (https://tinyurl.com/yyhkaesn). The procedure and measures in 
Study 3a and 3b were identical. 
Manipulation of inequality. The experiment was conducted online. After 
participants granted their consent to participate, they were asked to imagine that they were 
going to live in a fictitious society called Bimboola (Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015, Sánchez-
Rodríguez, Willis, Jetten, & Rodríguez-Bailón, in press, see Supplementary Materials for 
details). Participants learned that Bimboola consisted of three income groups and all 
participants were informed to think of themselves as belonging to the middle-income group 
which earned 40,000 Bimbolean Coins (BC) per month. Participants were then randomly 
assigned to the high or low inequality condition. In the high inequality condition, the 
wealthiest group was presented as very wealthy (77,000 BC) and the poor group as very poor 
(3,000 BC). In the low inequality condition, the income differences between the three income 
groups in Bimboola society were less pronounced (i.e., the wealthy group earned 50,000 BC 
and the poor group earned 30,000 BC). To improve the realism of the procedure, participants 
were asked to imagine they lived in Bimboola and, to get their life started, they were invited 
to pursue the essentials in life such as a house, mode of transport and holiday. Participants 
could only choose items that the middle-income group could afford and the houses, cars and 
holidays that they could choose from were identical in the low and high inequality conditions. 
However, the items that the poorest and the wealthiest group in Bimboola could afford 
differed across the conditions. Although the houses, cars and holidays open to the wealthiest 
group in Bimboola were only slightly more luxurious than those of the middle-group in the 
low inequality condition, the items that the wealthiest group could purchase in the high 
 inequality condition were much more luxurious and extravagant (large mansions, top of the 
range sports cars and expensive holidays). Likewise, although the items that people from the 
poorest group could purchase in the low inequality condition were only slightly less luxurious 
than those of the middle-group, the items they could afford in the high inequality condition 
were of much poorer quality, including substandard houses and old and damaged motorbikes; 
they did not have the means to go on a holiday. 
Measures. To check whether participants perceived the objective economic 
inequality manipulation as intended, they were asked to respond to the questions: “To what 
extent is Bimboola’s economic distribution unequal?” (1= Not unequal at all, 7 = Very 
unequal) and “To what extent is Bimboolean society equal?” (1= Not equal at all, 7 = Very 
equal). The latter item was reverse coded after which the two items were averaged with 
higher scores indicating higher inequality perceptions (r =.49, p < .001 in Study 3a, r =.91, p 
< .001 in Study 3b). We also checked whether participants correctly recalled which group 
they were assigned to with the item “which income level have you been assigned to”? 
Anomie was again measured with the 12-item scale from Teymoori et al. (2016, = 
.91 and .96) and the wish for a strong leader was measured using the seven items described in 
Study 2 (= .85 and .93). These items were adapted slightly to be relevant to the Bimboolean 
context, asking about their experience of anomie and wish for a strong leader in Bimboola. A 
number of other measures were included in this study (e.g., belief in conspiracy theories, 
perceived indispensability of the own income group, collective angst) which are part of 
another program of research and will not be reported here.  
Results  
Manipulation check. All participants answered correctly that they were assigned to 
the middle-income group. In addition, independent samples t-test on the economic inequality 
 check showed that the manipulation worked as intended: Those assigned to the high objective 
economic inequality condition perceived higher levels of inequality in Bimboola than those 
in the low objective economic inequality condition in both Study 3a, M = 5.61, SD = 1.18 
versus M = 3.79, SD = 1.15, t(94) = 7.62, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.35, 2.29], d = 1.56,and 
Study 3b, M = 6.42, SD = 0.90 versus M = 3.03, SD = 1.02, t(294) = 30.26, p < .001, 95% CI 
= [3.17, 3.62], d = 3.52.   
 Anomie perceptions and wish for a strong leader. Independent samples t-test on 
the anomie perceptions showed a significant effect for inequality: Participants in the high 
economic inequality condition perceived higher levels of anomie than those in the low 
economic inequality condition in both Study 3a, M = 4.64, SD = 0.85 versus M = 3.58, SD = 
0.88, t(94) = 6.03, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.71, 1.41], d = 1.23, and Study 3b, M = 4.67, SD = 
1.04 versus M = 2.67, SD = 0.84, t(294) = 18.14, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.78, 2.21], d = 2.12. 
Moreover, those in the high economic inequality condition reported a stronger wish for a 
strong leader than those in the low economic inequality condition in both Study 3a, M = 5.28, 
SD = .97 versus M = 4.49, SD = 1.01, t(94) = 3.90, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.39, 1.19], d = 0.80, 
and Study 3b, M = 4.61, SD = 1.37 versus M = 3.14, SD = 1.30, t(294) = 9.50, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [1.17, 1.78], d = 1.10 (see Figure 3).   
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The effect of economic inequality on anomie perceptions and wish for a strong 
leader, Study 3a (Upper) and 3b (Lower) 
Note. Error bars represent standard deviations. 
Mediational analysis. We examined whether anomie mediated the relation between 
manipulated levels of inequality and the wish for strong leadership using the analytic 
approach described in Study 2. We found a significant indirect effect of the inequality 
manipulation (coded as 0 = Low, 1 = High) via perceptions of anomie on the wish for strong 
leadership in both Study 3a, indirect effect = 0.55 (0.15), 95% CI [.29, .88] and the direct 
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 effect was no longer significant, direct effect = .24 (0.19), 95% CI [-.14, .62], and Study 3b, 
indirect effect = 1.05 (0.18), 95% CI [0.69, 1.42], and the direct effect was no longer 
significant, direct effect = 0.42 (0.22), 95% CI [-0.01, 0.85] (see Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Indirect effect of economic inequality on the wish for a strong leader mediated by 
the perception of anomie, Study 3a (Upper) and 3b (Lower).  
Note. ***p <.001 
 
Discussion 
These two studies provide experimental evidence that high (compared to low) 
inequality causally increases participants’ wish for a strong leader. Moreover, increased 
anomie perceptions help to explain this relation; Inequality also causally enhanced 
perceptions of anomie and these increased anomie perceptions, in turn, were related to the 
wish for a strong leader. 
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 The topic of economic inequality has not just captured the eye of academics, but of 
the general public and politicians alike. This is not surprising because economic inequality 
has pernicious effects on a range of outcomes: it is associated with increased criminality, 
poor mental and physical health, and lower levels of generalized trust (see Van de Werfhorst 
& Salverda, 2012; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). Yet, much remains unknown about the effects 
economic inequality has on social behavior and political attitudes (see Jetten et al., 2017). 
The current studies add to existing research by showing that perceived economic inequality 
also enhances individuals’ wish for a strong leader. Using both correlational (Studies 1 and 2) 
and experimental (Study 3a&b) designs, we showed that economic inequality is positively 
associated with a wish for a strong leader who is willing to use undemocratic means to 
achieve outcomes (Studies 2 and 3a&b).  
By investigating the mediating role of anomie, we were able to provide an initial 
explanation for why inequality is positively related to a wish for a strong leader: perceptions 
of economic inequality (Studies 1 and 2) as well as objective economic inequality (Studies 3a 
&b) enhances the perception that society is breaking down and an enhanced sense of anomie 
is associated with a greater wish for a strong leader who can take firm action and stop the 
(moral) erosion of society. This finding underscores the idea that inequality does not only 
have pernicious effects on the health and well-being of people, but may also affect their 
perception of the health of society. In turn, this is consequential for the type of leader they 
feel their society needs in order to overcome its difficulties.  
Implications, limitations and directions for future research 
Although the current research yielded novel results that help explain the conditions 
under which a society will desire a strong leader, some limitations of this research should be 
noted—limitations that point to promising avenues for future research. First, even though we 
believe our findings help to explain the resurgence of populism in many Western countries, it 
 is also clear that we only examined a limited set of characteristics that define populist leaders 
(e.g., their willingness to break rules to achieve desired outcomes). In this research, we 
focused on economic inequality, but note that the historical origins of inequality and other 
forms of inequality (e.g., educational inequality) may affect outcomes in unique ways. In 
addition, inequality may also affect other features that characterize populist leaders (such as 
their endorsement of anti-immigrant policies or their aversion of globalization) as well as 
actual voting behavior. These questions are fruitful avenues for future research. To strengthen 
the case for mediation, future research should also manipulate anomie perceptions and 
explore its moderating power in the inequality-wish for a strong leader relation.  
Second, it may be tempting for some readers to place the current findings in the 
contemporary turbulent political landscape, and specifically associate the rising levels of 
economic inequality with the success of populist leaders. Results are suggestive of these two 
trends being related: The apparent growth in support for strong leaders worldwide may partly 
be due to increasing levels of economic inequality. More specifically, these results suggest 
that the successes of the radical right (e.g., Mols & Jetten, 2017; Mudde, 2013) may partly be 
explained by the levels of economic inequality, because economic inequality (subjective 
perceptions and at times objective inequality, Studies 3a&b) may evoke perceptions of 
societal dysfunction (i.e., anomie). However, it is also clear that there is no automatic link 
between inequality and the appeal of populist parties and radical leaders (Mols & Jetten, 
2016; Mudde, 2013). Future research should investigate possible differences between 
countries, and focus on the explaining role of broader structural and historical factors that 
may trigger the collective wish for a strong leader.  
Conclusion 
Our research showed that both subjective and objective inequality are associated with 
a stronger wish for a strong leader. This underlines the idea that analyzing socio-political 
 behavior and attitudes through a social psychological lens is a fruitful exercise. It also 
underscores the notion that inequality (and in particular the perceptions of the levels of 
inequality in a society) may have more far-reaching consequences than have hitherto been 
recognized.  
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